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Abstract
Disclosure-control is a traditional statistical methodology for protecting pri-
vacy when data is released for analysis. Disclosure-control methods have en-
joyed a revival in the data mining community, especially after the introduction
of the k-anonymity model by Samarati and Sweeney. Algorithmic advances on
k-anonymisation provide simple and effective approaches to protect private in-
formation of individuals via only releasing k-anonymous views of a data set.
Thus, the k-anonymity model has gained increasing popularity. Recent research
identifies some drawbacks of the k-anonymity model and presents enhanced k-
anonymity models. This paper reviews problems of the k-anonymity model and
its enhanced variants, and different methods for implementing k-anonymity. It
compares the k-anonymity model with the secure multiparty computation-based
privacy-preserving techniques in the data mining literature. The paper also dis-
cusses further development directions of the k-anonymous data releasing.
1 Introduction
Various organisations, such as hospitals, medical administrations and insurance com-
panies, have collected a large amount of data over years. However, gold nuggets in
these data are unlikely to be discovered if the data is locked in data custodians’ storage.
A major risk of releasing data for public research is revealing the private information
of individuals in data.
Disclosure-control (Adam & Wortmann 1989, Cox 1980, Willenborg & de Waal
1996, Hundepool & Willenborg 1996) is a traditional methodology for privacy-preserving
data releasing. Most of them concentrate on maintaining statistics of data invariant.
Disclosure-control methodology revives in the data mining community due to pri-
vacy concerns in powerful data mining processes. The data mining community aims
to build strong privacy-preserving models and design efficient, optimal and scalable
heuristic solutions. Data perturbation (Agrawal & Srikant 2000, Agrawal & Aggarwal
2001, Rizvi & Haritsa 2002) and the k-anonymity model (Samarati & Sweeney 1998,
Sweeney 2002a, Samarati 2001) are two major techniques to achieve the goal. Data
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perturbation methods are not for all but only for specific data mining functionali-
ties (Agrawal & Srikant 2000, Agrawal & Aggarwal 2001, Rizvi & Haritsa 2002). The
k-anonymity model has been extensively studied recently because of its simplicity and
general effectiveness, see, e.g., (Iyengar 2002, Wang, Yu & Chakraborty 2004, Fung,
Wang & Yu 2005, Bayardo & Agrawal 2005, Aggarwal, Feder, Kenthapadi, Motwani,
Panigrahy, Thomas & Zhu 2005, Meyerson & Williams 2004).
An alternative methodology for privacy preservation is based on Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC) techniques (Yao 1982, Yao 1986), where SMC is used
to ensure that nothing should be revealed during the data mining process (Lindell
& Pinkas 2002, Vaidya & Clifton 2003, Wright & Yang 2004, Kantarcioglu, Jin &
Clifton 2004). Comparing with the disclosure-control data releasing methodology, the
SMC-based methodology is usually inefficient and brings strict restriction on the ways
to use data. The former is more efficient and give users more flexibility on using data.
Therefore, disclosure-control data releasing, such as k-anonymity, has great potential
for immediate real world applications.
In the rest of this paper, we introduce the k-anonymity model and discuss how
it protects private information in data in Section 2. We then discuss problems asso-
ciating with the k-anonymity model and some enhanced models to overcome these
problems in Section 3. After that we summarise major techniques for implementing
k-anonymisation in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare relative strengths and weak-
nesses of k-anonymisation and SMC-based privacy-preserving techniques. Finally, in
the last section we discuss some possible future directions.
2 k-anonymity model
Many organisations are increasingly sharing data by exchanging or publishing raw
data containing un-aggregated information about individuals. These data is normally
carefully de-identified. Names, medical care card numbers, addresses are removed. It
is assumed that individual is not identifiable and hence their privacy, such as medical
conditions, is protected.
However, such a de-identification procedure does not guarantee the privacy of in-
dividuals in the data. Sweeney reported that 87% of the population of the United States
can be uniquely identified by the combinations of attributes: gender, date of birth, and
5-digit zip code (Sweeney 2002b). Sweeney also showed that the medical records
of the governor of Massachusetts is supposedly anonymous but his medical data are
uniquely identified by a linking attack. Gender, date of birth and zip code attributes
were used in the linking attack by linking Massachusetts voter registration records,
which included the name, gender, zip code, and date of birth, to medical data, which
also include gender, zip code, date of birth as well as diagnosis.
Though explicit identifiers are removed from a data set, some attributes, for exam-
ple, gender, date of birth and postcode in the above example, can potentially identify
individuals in populations. Such a set of attributes is called a quasi-identifier.S Sama-
rati and Sweeney proposed a model for privacy protection called k-anonymity (Samarati
& Sweeney 1998, Sweeney 2002b, Samarati 2001). A data set satisfies k-anonymity if
every record in the data set is identical to at least k−1 other records with respect to the
set of quasi-identifier attributes; and such a data set is so-called k-anonymous. As a re-
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Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1 male 25 4350 . . . depression
2 male 27 4351 . . . depression
3 male 22 4352 . . . flu
4 male 28 4353 . . . flu
5 female 34 4352 . . . depression
6 female 31 4352 . . . flue
7 female 38 4350 . . . cancer
8 female 35 4350 . . . cancer
9 male 42 4351 . . . cancer
10 male 42 4350 . . . cancer
11 male 45 4351 . . . cancer
12 male 45 4350 . . . cancer
Table 1: A Raw Medical Data Set
sult, an individual is indistinguishable from at least k−1 individuals in a k-anonymous
data set.
For example, Table 1 shows a simplified medical data set. It does not contain per-
sonal identification attributes, such as name, address, and medical care card number.
However, the unique combinations of gender, age and postcode still reveal sensitive
information of individuals. For example, the first record is unique in these three at-
tributes, and the depression condition is revealed by the unique combination.
To avoid privacy breaching, Table 1 can be modified to Table 2. In Table 2, age is
grouped into intervals, and postcodes are clustered into large areas. Symbol ‘*’ denotes
any digit. A record in the quasi-identifier is identical to at least 3 other records, and
therefore, no individual is identifiable.
k-anonymisation becomes popular in data publishing because of its simplicity and
the availability of many algorithms. However, the k-anonymity model may still reveal
sensitive information under some attacks, and hence does not guarantee privacy. We
discuss its enhanced models in the following section.
3 Enhanced k-anonymity models
The k-anonymity model may reveal sensitive information under the following two
types of attacks (Machanavajjhala, Gehrke & Kifer 2006).
1. Homogeneity attack to a k-anonymity table: Bob and Tom are two hostile neigh-
bors. Bob knows that Tom goes to hospital recently and tries to find out the disease
Tom suffers. Bob finds the 4-anonymous table as in Table 2. He knows that Tom is 42
years’old and lives in the suburb with postcode 4350. Tom must be record 9, 10, 11, or
12. All four patients are cancer sufferers. Bob knows for sure that Tom suffers cancer.
Therefore, homogeneous values in the sensitive attribute of a k-anonymous group
leak privacy information.
2. Background knowledge attack to a k-anonymity table: Bob and Alice are friends
and Bob does not want Alice to know his medical condition. Alice knows Bob goes to
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Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1 male 20 - 29 435* . . . depression
2 male 20 - 29 435* . . . depression
3 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
4 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
5 female 30 - 39 435* . . . depression
6 female 30 - 39 435* . . . flu
7 female 30 - 39 435* . . . cancer
8 female 30 - 39 435* . . . cancer
9 male 40 - 49 435* . . . cancer
10 male 40 - 49 435* . . . cancer
11 male 40 - 49 435* . . . cancer
12 male 40 - 49 435* . . . cancer
Table 2: A 4-Anonymous Data Set of Table 1
hospital, but does not know what the medical problem is. She finds the 4-anonymous
table containing Bob’s record. Bob is 25 years old and lives in suburb with postcode
4352. Bob’s record must be record 1, 2, 3 or 4. Based on the table, Alice does not
know whether Bob suffers depression or flu. However, she knows Bob did not have a
flu for a long time. So, Alice knows nearly for sure that Bob suffers depression.
Therefore, k-anonymity does not protect individuals from a background knowl-
edge attack.
Machanavajjhala et al. presented an l-diversity model to enhance the k-anonymity
model (Machanavajjhala et al. 2006). The l-diversity principle is described as the fol-
lowing. A k-anonymous group in a disclosed table contains at least l well represented
values in the sensitive attribute. For example, records 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Table 2 form a
3-diverse group. The records contain three values with the frequencies of 25%, 25%
and 50%. The frequencies are identical to those from the whole data set. Therefore,
no additional information can be inferred from this group than from the original ta-
ble. The difference between the prior and post beliefs of sensitive values is minimised.
However, simply uniforming every k-anonymous groups of a released data set may
diminish the usefulness of information in the quasi-identifer in the data set.
A practical model normally trades strong protection with data utility. The l-diversity
model is strong, but may not be practical. If we try to protect every value in the
sensitive attributes, it may be better not to publish either sensitive attributes or the
quasi-identifier. Especially for the background knowledge attack, how much knowl-
edge should we assume an adversary has? If an adversary has very strong background
knowledge, any published data is not safe.
A more practical approach is not to consider every value in the sensitive attribute
as sensitive. For example, people may want to keep depression as private, but not flu
and viral infections. If we only have a small number of sensitive vales, a reasonable
protection is that the inference confidence from a group of k-anonymous records to
a sensitive value is below a threshold. This is the basic idea of (α, k)-anonymity
model (Wong, Li, Fu & Wang 2006). This model keeps the inference confidence to
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Quasi identifier Other attributes Sensitive attributes
Gender Age Postcode Diagnosis
1 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
2 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
3 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
4 male 20 - 29 435* . . . flu
5 female 30 - 39 435* . . . depression
6 female 30 - 39 435* . . . flu
7 female 30 - 39 435* . . . viral infections
8 female 30 - 39 435* . . . viral infections
Table 3: A (0.25, 4)-Anonymous Table
sensitive values lower than α, a user defined threshold. This model is simple and
effective to prevent some sensitive values from homogeneity attacks. An example of
(α, k)-anonymous table is given in Table 3. In this example, flu and viral infections are
not considered as sensitive, the inference confidence from (female & 30-39 & 435*)
to depression is 25%.
Another model to prevent homogeneity attack in classification is the template-
based model (Wang, Fung & Yu 2005). This model allows users to specify what types
of inference channels should be blocked in the released data as templates. The model
tries to eliminate the sensitive inferences in a released data set, and to preserve the
classification value of the data. The model keeps the confidence of sensitive inferences
from a group of individuals to sensitive values lower than the user specified levels. This
model is good for users who know exactly what inferences are damaging, but is not
suitable for users who do not.
4 Various k-anonymisation methods
There are several different methods to modify a data set to be k-anonymous, or so-
called k-anonymisation methods. We outline these techniques in this section.
Generalisation: A common way for k-anonymization is achieved by generalisa-
tion — an attribute value is generalised according to its attribute domain hierarchy.
For example, date of birth D/M/Y is replaced by M/Y. All attribute domains are in hi-
erarchical structures. Domains with fewer values are more general than domains with
more values for an attribute. The most general domain contains only one value. For
example, date of birth in D/M/Y is a lower level domain, and date of birth in Y is a
higher level domain. The most general level of date of birth domain contains value
unknown ‘*’. Numerical attributes are in a hierarchical structure too. That is {value,
interval, *}. Intervals can be determined by users or a machine learning algorithm,
say, a discretisation method. As illustrated in Figure 1, 10 year interval level in birth
domain is more general than year level.
Global recoding and local recoding anonymisation methods are two ways to
achieve k-anonymity. Another name for global recoding is full domain generalisation.
In global recoding, the generalisation happens at the attribute domain level. When an
attribute value is generalised, every occurrence of the value is replaced by the new gen-
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Figure 1: Two examples of domain hierarchies. one for categorical values and one for
numerical values.
eralised value. Many methods are global recoding models, such as (Sweeney 2002a,
LeFevre, DeWitt & Ramakrishnan 2005, Bayardo & Agrawal 2005, Samarati 2001,
Iyengar 2002, Wang et al. 2004, Fung et al. 2005). DataFly (Sweeney 2002a) and
Incognito (LeFevre et al. 2005) are two typical ones. An advantage of global recoding
is that an anonymous view has uniform domains, but it may unnecessarily lose many
detailed information.
It is possible to optimise a global recoding method when the quasi-identifier is not
large. The optimisation here is in terms of minimising generalisation steps to achieve k
anonymity. Incognito (LeFevre et al. 2005) and k-optimise (Bayardo & Agrawal 2005)
are two examples. However, the optimal search is ultimately exponential to the size
of quasi-identifier though it is substantially faster than naive search. These optimal
algorithms only perform well on data with small quasi-identifiers.
A major problem with global recoding methods is that they over-generalise the
tables and result in many unnecessary distortions. We use an example to show this.
Suppose that we have 1000 records, among which only two are uniquely identifiable
according to their postcodes. Generalisation of all postcode values to accommodate
these two records into a k-anonymous table is overkilling.
A local-recoding method generalises attribute values at cell level. A generalised
attribute value co-exists with the original value. A local recoding method does not
over-generalise a table and hence may minimise the distortion of an anonymous view.
In the above example regarding over-generalisation problem of the global recoding
generalisation, a solution in local recoding will only generalise the two records with
other k − 2 records. Optimal local recoding, which is to minimise distortions of a
data set for k-anonymisation, is NP-hard as discussed in (Meyerson & Williams 2004,
Aggarwal et al. 2005). A local recoding method has to be heuristic. More recent work
of local recoding k-anonymisation was reported in (LeFevre, DeWitt, & Ramakrishnan
2006). The method deals with numerical values, and does not involve attribute domain
hierarchies.
Both global recoding and local recoding algorithms lead to a loss of information,
because either less detailed information is provided or some information is not given
at all. The distortion caused by a heuristic local recoding algorithm is significantly
smaller than an optimal global recoding method (Wong et al. 2006, Li, Wong, Fu &
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Pei 2006) although there is no optimal algorithms for local recoding.
In order to make the information loss as low as possible, the softwareµ-ARGUS (Hundepool
& Willenborg 1996) aims to reach a good balance between global recoding and local
suppression, where attribute values are replaced by a missing value. It starts by re-
coding some variables globally until the number of unsafe combinations that have
to be protected by local suppression is sufficiently low. It allows a user to spec-
ify the global recodings interactively, by providing the user with necessary auxiliary
information. A user may also decide to let µ-ARGUS eliminate unsafe combina-
tions automatically, which will involve the solution of a complex optimisation prob-
lem (Hundepool & Willenborg 1996). µ-ARGUS does not guarantee k-anonymity as
discovered in (Sweeney 2002a). Following a similar strategy as µ-ARGUS for mi-
crodata, τ -ARGUS (Hundepool & Willenborg 1996) is developed for the disclosure
control of tabular data. τ -ARGUS works efficiently only on limited number of at-
tributes.
k-anonymisation via clustering: A more general view of k-anonymisation is
clustering with a constraint of the minimum number of objects in every cluster (Aggarwal,
Feder, Kenthapadi, Zhu, Panigrahy & Thomas 2006). A number of methods that
deal with numerical attributes approach identity protection by clustering (Agrawal
& Aggarwal 2001, Aggarwal 2005) have been proposed. A recent work (Domingo-
Ferrer & Torra 2005) extends a clustering-based method (Domingo-Ferrer & Mateo-
Sanz 2002) to ordinal attributes, but neither deals with attributes in hierarchical struc-
tures. Other work (Aggarwal et al. 2005, Meyerson & Williams 2004) dealing with
categorical attributes does not consider attribute hierarchies. Li et al. (Li et al. 2006)
recently presented a method achieving k-anonymity in hierarchical attribute structures
by local recoding.
5 Comparison of k-anonymity model with SMC-based ap-
proaches
The definition of privacy-preserving in SMC (Secure Multiparty Computation)-based
approaches (Vaidya & Clifton 2004, Wright & Yang 2004) is different from that of the
k-anonymity model. It concerns that nothing other than the final data mining result
is revealed during the data mining process. In other words, intermediate computation
results don’t disclose privacy of the data, including identification and sensitive attribute
values. This definition is closer to the definition of security used in SMC techniques
initially suggested by Yao (Yao 1982).
As we mentioned above, both k-anonymity and SMC are used in privacy-preserving
data mining, but they are quite different in terms of efficiency, accuracy, security and
privacy as shown in Figure 2.
The k-anonymity provides a formal way of privacy protection by preventing from
re-identification of data to fewer than a group of k entities, and the data with k-
anonymity can be used straightway by various parties. However, the application of
SMC is inefficient. The notion of computational indistinguishability is crucial to SMC.
A distribution of numbers is said to be computationally indistinguishable from another
distribution of numbers if no polynomial time program can distinguish the two dis-
tributions. Goldreich et al. proved that any problem representable as a circuit can
115
Proceedings of the National e-Health Privacy and Security Symposium 2006 (ehPASS'06) - ISBN: 1741071380 © 2006 QUT.

0
high
high
high
Security
Accuracy
Efficiency
k−anonymity
SMC
Figure 2: K-anonymity and SMC
be securely solved (Goldreich, Micali & Wigderson 1987), but the computation cost
depends on the input’s size. Such a generic method based on circuit evaluation is ex-
pensive (even for small inputs) and the computational cost is prohibitive for large in-
puts. Thus, generic SMC protocols are impractical for the achievement of SMC since
large inputs are typically required in data mining. Therefore, the k-anonymity model
and its variants are more efficient than techniques based on generic SMC protocols.
However, in the real world, rather than using a perfect SMC protocol with nothing re-
vealed, more efficient but not completely secure protocols can be used in which we are
able to clearly prove what is known and what remains secret. Along with this direc-
tion, there are several research efforts to improve the computation efficiency (Vaidya
& Clifton 2004, Gilburd, Schuster & Wolff 2004, Wright & Yang 2004).
A SMC-based solution provides exactly what is revealed. During k-anonymisation,
the key step is to generalise attribute values. For example, the ages 22 and 25 in Ta-
ble 1 could be generalised to an interval [20 - 29] in Table 2. Hence, the data in the
k-anonymity model is modified to satisfy the anonymity feature for privacy protection.
This largely trades off the accuracy in data mining.
The most general definition of privacy commonly accepted is to protect only the
actual data values during transactions. Privacy is preserved if none of the data is known
exactly. A stronger definition of privacy has initiated by the cryptographic community.
For example, Yao (Yao 1986) proposed a semantic definition of it: information com-
municated between parties won’t enable one party to compute any polynomial time
predicates with greater accuracy than they could without the communication. On the
other hand, the k-anonymity model aims to protect just the (exact) actual data values.
Privacy is preserved in the k-anonymity model when no exact values are learned. The
security definition of the k-anonymity model is much weaker than the one in the SMC
model.
Almost all the SMC-based approaches may suffer privacy inference vulnerabil-
ity (Farkas & Jajodia 2002), because they do not consider the privacy risk caused by
the release of final result (Atzori, Bonchi, Giannotti & Pedreschi 2005). For exam-
ple, via a SMC-based approach, the following association rule from a binary table is
released.
a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ⇒ a4 [supp = 99, conf = 99.0%] (1)
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It means that 99 individuals in the table have a1, a2, a3 and a4 simultaneously. The
confidence value is 99.0%. According to the association rule definition (Atzori et al.
2005), one may easily derive that 100 ( suppconf = 9999.0% = 100) individuals have a1, a2
and a4. That means, one and only one individual in the table has a1, a2, a4, but not a3.
Thus, a1 ∧ a2 ∧¬a3 ∧ a4 can serve as a quasi-identifier for this table. This association
rule could be a privacy threat, say, via a linking attack. As a comparison, enhanced
K-anonymity models focuses on eliminating this kind of privacy threats.
6 Conclusions and discussions
In this paper, we have introduced k-anonymity model and discussed how it protects
private information in data. We have outlined typical problems associating with the
k-anonymity model and considered some enhanced models to overcome the problems.
We have summarised major techniques implementing k-anonymisation. We also have
simply compared the k-anonymity model with the Secure Multiparty Computation
(SMC)-based techniques, in terms of efficiency, accuracy and security.
There are several problems of the k-anonymity model or its variants. We list some
of them.
• One is how to determine quasi-identifiers during k-anonymisation of a data set.
In other words, which kinds of other data sources would be used to construct
a linking attack? The problem is arguably the same as which kind background
knowledge an attacker would have. This problem may be difficult for both data
custodians and privacy-preserving technique developers to answer.
• The second one is how to choose an optimal parameter k for the k-anonymity
model for a given data set. A similar problem is what the best tradeoff between
privacy protection and data accuracy is.
• Do these enhanced k-anonymity models, such as l-diversity or (α, k)-anonymity,
guarantee privacy? If not, are the underlying principle of SMC able to be used
to further enhance these models? Is there a model which guarantees privacy
theoretically?
• As for the potential privacy inference vulnerability of the SMC-based privacy-
preserving techniques discussed in Section 5, can the k-anonymity model or its
variants be used to enhance these SMC-based techniques?
• These k-anonymity models are suitable for different scenarios. In addition, usu-
ally such a technique alone cannot provide an ideal solution for privacy protec-
tion. These technical solutions should be incorporated into appropriate legisla-
tion and policy. Which kinds of guidelines we should follow?
Most of these problems are crucial to the real-life applications of k-anonymous
data releasing. We leave them as future research directions.
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